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Drawing on the insights of ILO/JASPA missions to seven 
countries, especially those to Tanzania and Zambia, this paper 
examines selected aspects of the crisis of poor rural people 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Rapid rises in population and other 
factors are likely to exacerbate deprivation in both more 
accessible 'core' and less accessible 'peripheral' areas. 
Urban-based professionals tend to underperceive and 
misperceive this deprivation and some of the priorities of the 
poor themselves. These includue not only health, livelihoods, 
and basic services, but also an adequate supply of basic goods 
like matches, soap, salt, sugar, cooking oil, paraffin and 
clothes which have often become acutely scarce and costly. 
Remedial measures are suggested, but the danger is recognised 
that many of the rural poor may remain or become too weak to 
make effective demands for a better deal. 
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THE CRISIS OF AFRICA'S RURAL POOR: PERCEPTIONS AND PRIORITIES 
If we were to give a one sentence definition of a basic needs 
strategy it might be: a basic needs strategy advocates that 
the poor groups in society be made the focus of development 
and helped to meet their most basic human needs. 
ILO (Sierra Leone) 1981c:73 
The Perspective: whose crisis? 
The crisis of development in sub-Saharan Africa is usually 
analysed from a 'core', top-down, centre-outwards perspective. 
The national economy and its performance is the point of 
departure and throughout the main point of reference. The 
much debated Berg Report - Accelerated Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1981) - originated in concern 
expressed by the African Govenors of the World Bank in 1979 at 
the dim economic prospects for the nations-*- of SSA. They 
asked that the Bank prepare 'a special paper on the economic 
development problems of these countr ies' (my italics). The 
Report 'discusses the factors that explain slow economic 
growth in Africa in the recent past, analyses, policy changes 
and program orientations needed to promote faster growth, and 
concludes with a set of recommendations to donors...' (World 
Bank, 1981). Although the Report considers basic services for 
education and health, it is more preoccupied with the 
efficiency of services and cost-reduction than with coverage. 
The critique of the Berg Report published by the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS 1983) includes expressions of dismay 
(e.g. Colclough 1983) at the diminished access to services 
implied by the recommendations of the Report, but most of the 
critique starts, as does the Report, with thinking about 
national economies, their sectors and their external 
relat ions. 
Debates about national economies are critical. Nothing in 
this paper should be taken as undervaluing the importance of 
reversing national economic decline in SSA and increasing the 
size of the national cakes. Nor is it intended to draw 
attention away from the part international forces have played 
in generating national economic crises. The various ILO/JASPA 
Reports have made these clear enough. But this paper sets out 
to examine a complementary perspective, that of the poorer 
rural people. 
Nor is this to deny urban deprivation. It has become more 
acute with food shortages and as the urban informal sector has 
been saturated. In urban Ghana in early 1981 it took nearly 
two days' earnings of the minimum wage to buy one loaf of 
bread (Kofi and Hansen 1981: 52-3) . But rural poverty is less 
visible, involves far larger numbers of people, and is 
typically deeper and more vulnerable to drought and other 
disasters. The 1974 household budget survey in Zambia 
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illustrates relative urban and rural poverty with the finding 
that 95 per cent of rural households had incomes lower than 
the average income in urban squatter areas (ILO 1981b vol. 
2:35). The focus of this paper is therefore on the crisis of 
the poorer rural people who, through urban and class biases, 
usually come last, and the starting point is their numbers and 
location. 
Rural Population and Poverty 
The rate and nature of change in rural SSA probably have no 
historical precedent. Change and poverty have many 
dimensions, and causes are political, economic and social as 
well as physical and demographic. But the rate and scale of 
change is most simply indicated by population growth. Taking 
the seven countries which invited ILO/JASPA basic needs 
missions, we find that the rates of population growth in all 
except Somalia are projected to be higher in 1980 - 2000 than 
in earlier decades. Estimates of rates of growth have 
themselves risen. The World Bank's projection for the 
population of these seven countries by the year 2000 has risen 
by 10 per cent over the past five years. According to the 
1984 projections, the total populations of these countries 
would almost double (the increase is 88 per cent) in the 18 
years from mid-1982 to the year 2000, and Kenya's would more 
than double. 
Table 1: Aspects of Population Growth in Seven African 
Countr ies 
Percentage Population (mn) Percentage 
rural annual growth 
in 1982 mid-1982 2000 60-•70 70-•80 80-2000 
Kenya 85 18.1 40(31) 3. 2 4. .0 4.4 
Lesotho 87 1.4 2(2) 2. 0 2. 4 2.9 
Nigeria 79 90.6 169 (157) 2. 5 2. ,5 3.5 
Sierra Leone 77 3.2 5(6) 1. 7 2. .0 2.4 
Somalia 68 4.5 7(7) 2. 8 2. ,8 2.4 
Tanzania 87 19.8 36 (32) 2. 7 3. ,4 3.5 
Zambia 55 6.0 11(10) 2. 6 3, ,1 3.6 
Totals: 143.6 270(245) 
Source: World Development Report 1984:218, 254, 160. Figures 
in brackets are estimates of population in the year 
2000 given five years earlier in World Development 
Report 1979:158. 
The implications for the rural areas and the rural poor are 
dramatic. As the Berg Report (World Bank '981:113) points out 
for SSA as a whole, since the urban population is relatively 
small (only 21 per cent in 1980) most of the additional people 
will begin life in rural areas. Even if the cities were to 
grow at unprecendented rates, they could only absorb part of 
the rural increase. If only 60 per cent of the increase 
remained rural, declining to 50 per cent by the year 2000, the 
rural population would still be 50 per cent greater in two 
decades. One concludes that in most countries there will be 
massive pressure on rural resources and services and intense 
competition for rural livelihoods. 
Patterns and problems differ by country and by region. This 
can be illustrated by comparing Zambia and Kenya. In Zambia, 
the dominant feature has been urban bias draining labour from 
rural areas. Rural deprivation has interlocking regional and 
demographic dimensions. The more favoured areas, closer to 
the line of rail, contrast with the remoter, less favoured 
areas. The less favoured areas have been found (Marter and 
Honeybone 1976) to have higher proportions of small, 
labour-scarce and weak households, with higher ratios of 
dependents, both children and old people, to active adults, 
about half the average farm size, and very much smaller per 
capita crop incomes. Male outmigration from these areas is 
associated with a high proportion of female-headed households, 
in Luapula Province as high as one third of all households. 
In Kenya, the dominant feature is pressure of population on 
land. The subdivision of land has been rapid in many areas. 
Estimates suggest that hectares of good agricultural land per 
person will drop dramatically: in Kiambu and Machakos 
Districts, halving from 1969 to 1989 , from 0.40 and 0.36 to 
0.20 and 0.18 hectares per person respectively (Livingstone 
|f 1981, vol. 2:5). However, the single most important way in 
which population pressure has been absorbed is spontaneous 
rural to rural migration, which is more significant than 
I rural to urban. It has been marked in the past decade as 
families have moved in search of land. Evidence 
(Migot-Adholla cited in Livingstone 1981, vol. 2:14) indicates 
that those who move have come over time from less poor 
sections of the community than before. As Livingstone 
« observes, 'Given the inevitable increase in land pressure, and 
the associated poverty, it is evidently serious if it requires 
wealth to migrate, since the poverty of those remaining will 
tend to be reinforced' (Livingstone 1981, vol. 2:14). Much of 
the migration has been to semi-arid regions where unstable and 
risky agriculture competes with and displaces pastoralists. 
Deprivation of Core and Periphery 
One conclusion from this comparison is the care needed in 
generalising. In Kenya the families moving to remoter areas, 
though poor, are not the poorest and are likely to be 
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physically strong. In Zambia, many households left in the 
remoter areas are physically weak, drained of manpower by 
rural-urban migration. In Kenya, a dominant feature of rural 
poverty is pressure on resources. In Zambia where land is 
still locally abundant, it is a labour constraint. 
Two categories of deprivation are suggested by this 
comparison: that of the rural core, and that of the rural 
periphery. Typically, core deprivation is found in areas 
which are more accessible, of higher potential, with more 
developed economies and better services, and where population 
is concentrated and pressure on land intense. Typically, 
peripheral deprivation is found in areas which are less 
accessible, of lower potential, with less developed economies, 
worse services, more scattered population, and (though not 
always) less pressure on land. Both core and peripheral 
deprivation include those too poor or too weak to migrate but 
the patterns of deprivation also differ: shops, markets and 
services are physically available for the core poor, but they 
often lack the means to make use of them; for the peripheral 
poor, shops, markets and services often do not exist. For the 
core poor, isolation is largely economic, a function of 
livelihood; for the peripheral poor it is, in addition, a 
function of distance, roads and transport. For the core poor, 
a basic problem is effective demand; for the peripheral poor, 
it is often effective supply. Contrast the core poverty of 
the women interviewed in Kakamega by Joseph Ssennyonga 
(1976:11) who said they had not eaten for three days, although 
there must have been food for sale in the shops nearby, with 
the peripheral poverty of women in the Chambeshi valley in 
Zambia who were prepared to do a day's work threshing paddy 
for payment in kind of about 100 gm of salt4 because salt was 
so scarce in their remote area (ILO 1981b:23). 
Whether core or peripheral, rural deprivation has many 
dimensions of which five of the more obvious are poverty (lack 
of wealth, lack of income), physical weakness (lack of 
strength, high dependency ratios), isolation (remoteness, lack 
of education), vulnerability (to becoming more deprived 
still), and powerlessness (economic, social and political) 
(Chambers 1983:108-14). The crisis of the rural poor could be 
described along any of these dimensions. Their relative 
importance varies by individual, gender, household, region and 
country. There is consequently much scope for selective 
perception and misleading generalisation and prescription on 
the part of elite outsiders. Which dimensions, if any, are 
perceived, and what solutions are recommended, depend not only 
on the objective reality but at least as much on those who 
perceive and recommend, their biases, contacts and 
predilections. In an attempt to get closer to the reality, 
let us examine and try to offset some of the more obvious 
outsiders' biases. 
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Outsiders' Biases 
Elite outsiders - meaning those who are neither rural nor poor 
- suffer from biases of contact and of values as a result of 
which rural poverty is underperceived and misperceived,5 and 
they are often out of date in their perceptions. 
i) biases of contact. For most outsiders, most of the time, 
contact with the poorer rural people occurs only through rural 
development tourism, the phenomenon of the brief and hurried 
rural visit from an urban centre. This imposes six biases 
against contact with and learning from the poorer rural 
people. These are spatial - close to urban centre, tarmac 
roads, roadsides, and the centres of villages, and in regions 
which are less remote within a country, in all cases precisely 
where the poorer people are less likely to be found; project -
towards places where there are projects; person - towards 
those that are better off, men rather than women, users of 
services and adopters of practices rather than non-users and 
non-adopters, and those who are active, present and living; 
seasonal - avoiding the bad times of the wet or very hot 
seasons; diplomatic - not seeking out the poorer for fear of 
giving offence; and professional - confined to the outsider's 
specialisation. These biases interlock so that much rural 
deprivation goes unrecognised; and the worst is almost 
entirely unseen. 
These biases have been exacerbated in rural Africa and 
elsewhere during the past decade by the rise in oil prices, 
foreign exchange crises, and cuts in government recurrent 
budgets: the rise in oil prices reduced fuel availability for 
government services; foreign exchange crises curtailed imports 
of vehicles and spare parts, as well as oil; and cuts in 
Government budgets fell, as usual, most heavily on items other 
than staff salaries, with the transport vote as a favourite 
, victim where the effects of cuts would not show. In Zambia, 
' the Ministry of Agriculture's votes were so reduced that in 
1980 it was possible to buy only one-fifth of the petrol that 
could be bought in 1973 (ILO 1981b:74) . When fuel is scarce, 
! travel is restricted to essentials such as collecting staff 
pay and visits by VIPS. The older and more decrepit vehicles 
become, the more reluctant staff are to take them on bad 
roads . The consequences have been unseen but devastating: a 
shrink back of travel and contact; a decline in peripheral 
services; and even less contact than before between elite 
outsiders like government staff and the poorer people, 
especially those of the peripheries. 
ii) biases of values. Outsiders also suffer from biases of 
learning and thinking which impede recognition and 
understanding of the predicament of the rural poor. Outsiders 
are conditioned to suppose that learning comes from the 
classroom, the textbook, the training course, the university. 
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It is rare to find a course on rural poverty. Rural people, 
especially the poor, are regarded as ignorant, and it can be 
difficult for outsiders to recognise that there is much to 
learn from them. It is the poor, though, who are the greatest 
experts on their problems, strategies and priorities. 
Outsiders are also conditioned to value, notice and prefer 
whatever is described as modern, sophisticated and scientific, 
and to look down on the things which are important to the 
poor. Several biases interlock, and can be illustrated by a 
list of what some might describe as 'sophisticated' and 
'pr imitive'. 
Thus in government programmes, research and extension, 
tractors are prefered to oxen, exotic cattle to native, cattle 
to sheep and goats, exotic trees to indigenous, cash crops to 
subsistence crops, and chemical fertiliser to organic. And 
preferences such as these tend to reduce the relevance of 
government programmes, research and extension for those who 
most need help. 
Table 2: Professional Preferences 
'Sophisticated' 
Urban 
Industr j.al 
High cost 
Capital-using 
Mechan ical 
Inorgan ic 
Large 
Modern 
Exotic 
Marketed 
Quanti f ied 
Geometrical 
Visible and seen 
Tidy 
Predictable 
Hard 
Clean 
Odourless 
'Pr imi tive' 
Rural 
Agr icultural 
Low cost 
Labour-using 
Animal or human 
Organic 
Small 
Trad itional 
Ind igenous 
Subsistence 
Unquantified 
Irregular 
Invisible or unseen 
Untidy 
Unpredicable 
Soft 
Dirty 
Smelly 
(Adapted from Chambers 1983:173) 
iii) lags in learning. A third bias is delayed learning. 
The rates of change in rural SSA are rapid and will continue 
to be so. Where population doubles in 20 years or less, one 
can be seriously misled in reading a report or article written 
two or three years earlier, based on fieldwork two or three 
years before that, and citing secondary data which are even 
older.8 Thinking similarly lags. Minds are set in a growth 
model. Little analysis has been undertaken of economic 
decline as a phenomenon, of the shrink-back of markets and 
contact from peripheries, of the slide back into subsistence 
and barter which has occurred in so much cf rural SSA. 
These three biases - of contact, of values, and of lags in 
learning - can combine so that less and less is known of the 
condition of the rural poorer, especially of the peripheral 
poorer. This makes prescriptions by outsiders more and more 
liable to error, and offsetting the biases more and more 
important. In doing this, one useful antidote is to enquire, 
again and again, about the priorities of the poorer rural 
people themselves. 
Whose Priorities? 
The three biases influence the priorities which elite 
outsiders assume for the rural poor. Urban, industrial and 
formal sector concerns are liable to be applied to rural 
conditions where they do not always fit. In a statement on 
basic needs in 1976, the Director-General of the ILO wrote: 
The satisfaction of basic needs means meeting of the 
minimum requirements of a family for personal 
consumption: food, shelter, clothing; it implies access 
to essential services, such as safe drinking-water, 
sanitation, transport, health and education; it implies 
that each person available for and willing to work should 
have an adequately remunerated job. 
(ILO 1976:7) 
Similarly, the Nigeria Constitution of 1978 laid down that the 
state 'shall direct its policy towards ensuring ... that 
suitable and adequate shelter, suitable and adequate food, a 
reasonable national minimum living wage as well as social 
security benefits would be provided for all citizens'. 
(Clause 16(2), cited in ILO 1981a:v). 
For most of the rural poor, however, the concepts of a job as 
in the ILO statement or of a minimum living wage as in the 
Nigeria Constitution, are irrelevant. Most of the rural poor 
are either subsistence or sub-subsistence cultivators, and 
many of them piece together their precarious livelihoods 
through repertoires of different activities at different 
seasons of the year. 
As the ILO Report for Nigeria pointed out (1981a:ll) basic 
needs have tended to consist of a rather subjective list, 
lacking a unifying focus. The Nigeria Report concentrated on 
health as the central requirement, seeing some other basic 
needs as means towards this. The Tanzania Report in contrast, 
presented a more general list, giving the various elements of 
basic needs as 'employment, nutrition, health, water, 
sanitation, shelter, education, transport, energy and people's 
participation' (ILO 1982:xv). 
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One may ask: whose lists are these? And based on what 
investigations? All elite outsiders know what is good for the 
poor, but it is surely the poor themselves who know best what 
they want. When asked, their priorities may surprise and even 
shock outsiders. In Botswana, one village wanted a South 
African mine recruiting agency. Reginald Green has noted the 
practical dangers of speculating abstractly on this: "... in 
one Tanzanian region the top priority of a significant 
proportion of villages was "vermin control" (i.e. either 
shotguns and cartridges or government employees with them to 
reduce baboon damage to crops), not, one fancies, a result 
anybody predicted (nor, unfortunately, one the Kigoma 
Intergrated Rural Development Project took seriously)' 
(1983:185-6). 
For all the rhetoric about participation, it is still rare 
enough for villages, let alone the poorer people in villages, 
to be consulted about their priorities: or, if they are 
consulted, for their preferences to be a source of learning 
and official action. 
A significant exception was a study commissioned by the Basic 
Needs Mission to Tanzania in 1980, and carried out under the 
supervision of S.M. Wangwe of the University of Dar es Salaam. 
A quick consultation was conducted by students in 10 villages 
in nine regions. This informal survey may itselt have 
included biases - in selection of villages, and who within the 
villages was consulted. (There is for example no indication 
to what extent women were interviewed.) Nevertheless, the 
villagers' reported priorities are striking in their 
consistency and in the manner in which they diverge from and 
add to those of outsiders. The Mission was surprised that 
every report stated that there was no danger of deforestation, 
although at the national level this had become a problem.10 
Nor did villagers see sanitation or housing as serious 
problems. Supplies for services - teaching materials and 
textboods for education, medicines and equipment for 
dispensaries - were stressed. When asked to rank their five 
basic needs, in most cases these were: food, water, 
dispensary, transport and essential commodities. The 
Mission's assessment was that: 'There seems little doubt that 
if villagers were pressed to give priorities to their main 
needs the first place would have gone to the supply of 
essential consumer goods.' (ILO 1982:285.) 
Yet the ILO list of basic needs did not explicitly include 
essential consumer goods as a category. In industrial, rich 
country and growth-oriented experience and thinking, the 
availability of essential consumer goods is taken for granted. 
One conclusion is that there can be nothing final about any 
list of basic needs; that each person, household, village and 
region may have different priorities; that these will change 
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over time; and that outsiders must be wary and self-doubting 
in promoting their own lists. 
Three themes 
With this caveat, three themes appear to deserve discussion, 
representing likely priorities of many of the rural poorer of 
SA: survival - health and livelihood; basic goods; and basic 
services. What priority they deserve will vary. In 
particular, the balance between livelihood and basic goods can 
be expected to vary between conditions of core deprivation 
where goods are available but livelihoods difficult for the 
poorer, to peripheral deprivation in which both livelihoods 
and goods are hard to come by. 
i) survival: health and livelihoods 
The rapidly rising populations of SSA reflect gains in health 
and livelihoods, albeit gains which quite often look 
precarious. Although health and livelihoods are basic to 
survival, both have a value which goes much further than 
survival. The Nigeria Basic Needs Mission made a case for 
putting health, both physical and mental, in a positive sense 
right at the centre. And livelihood should be much more than 
just a means to survival, contributing through the 
satisfactions of work to the quality of life. 
Of the two, livelihood is perhaps more misunderstood by urban 
elite outsiders. For most rural people, the term 'livelihood' 
fits their circumstances, wants and needs better than either 
'employment' or 'job'. A livelihood can be defined as a level 
of wealth and of stocks and flows of food and cash which 
provide for physical and social wellbeing and for security 
against impoverishment. This definition points less towards 
employment or a job, and more towards seeking to assure 
command over flows of food and cash, over productive assets, 
and over assets which can be buffers against contingencies, 
enabling poor people to meet sudden or major needs. The 
significance of buffers deserves stress. Almost everywhere, 
the poor have become more vulnerable to contingencies through 
the weakening of traditional social support which could be 
relied on in distress and need. At the same time, urban and 
formal sector thinking sees poverty most in terms of income. 
While income, in its broad sense including subsistence flows, 
is vital for poor rural people as for others, they also have a 
greater need now for buffers or cushions against disaster 
(such as small stock which can be sold at any time) than they 
had in the past. 
For the poorer rural producers some of the more critical 
elements in a livelihood are likely to be access to and 
ownership of land; micro-capital like tools and equipment; 
some livestock; remunerative activities in the slack seasons 
of the year; health to be able to work at the peak seasons; 
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arid markets and good prices for whatever they are able to 
produce for sale. In practice, rural-urban terms of trade 
often turn against rural producers (Lipton 1977) . In Zambia, 
between 1965 and 1980 the shift was a factor of three, meaning 
that rural producers had to sell three times as much to buy a 
shirt, soap or a box of matches (ILO 1981b:xxvi). Moreover, 
this understates the true shift because, especially in remoter 
rural areas, black market prices were higher than controlled 
prices. Even worse, the terms of trade also shifted most 
precisely against the poorer rural producers. Prices for 
maize grown and sold mainly by better off farmers were 
relatively well maintained because of the powerful lobby of 
large-scale maize producers; prices for the fish, charcoal, 
sorhgum, cassava and honey produced by the poorer people 
lagged far behind. 
Table 3: Changes in controlled rural producer prices in Zambia 
1971-79 
Percentage change 
1971 1979 1971-9 
Maize 4.00 9.00 125 
Dried fish 31.00 50.00 61 
Charcoal 1.75 2.50 43 
Sorghum 4.70 6.00 28 
(Low income urban 
price index) 100 242 (142) 
(ILO 1981b-65) 
i i) basic goods 
In earlier thinking, basic goods were taken for granted. As 
economic growth took place, shops and supplies penetrated the 
peripheries. With economic decline, they have in many places 
withdrawn. But the biases of rural visits and timelags in 
learning sustain rosy impressions. Thus the Berg Report: 
'Indeed, even the most casual vistor to a market town in 
Africa has to come away impressed by the range of goods and 
services available for sale, their variety and quality 
gradations, as well as by the evident dynamism and liveliness 
of the bargaining that characterises the simplest transaction 
..." (World Bank 1981: 64-65). 
This may be true in some economies, especially in their urban 
sectors. It is not true in others. In Zambia, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, and Uganda, to name but four, there has been a 
shrink back, a retraction, of commercial supplies and contact. 
In 1980 in Zambia, one could visit villages where there were 
well-built shops which had been closed for several years. 
Near Chungu in Luwingu District, where years earlier even 
bicycles had been on sale, there was only one small shop still 
open, selling but a few items. Many basic goods were not 
available in most rural areas - soap, salt, blankets, cooking 
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oil, paraffin, matches and the like. In Luapula Province, 
unavailability or high prices of goods such as glue, nails, 
gas bottles, leather, wax, needles, and cotton thread had 
forced many small artisans and businesses to give up during 
the previous five years (ILO 1981b, vol. 2:129). Many basic 
goods were subject to regulated prices which made no allowance 
for transport costs, and rural traders were vulnerable to 
prosecution if they sold above the regulated price. In these 
circumstances, there was no incentive to move goods out of 
urban centres, except for those who bought and then sold as 
hawkers on the black market, often at several times the 
regulated price. Shortages and price regulation not only 
deprived the rural people, and the peripheral poor most of 
all; through generating a high-priced black market, they also 
tilted the rural urban terms of trade even more against the 
rural side. 
The most striking evidence concerning basic goods comes from 
the village surveys conducted for the Tanzania Basic Needs 
mission (Table 4). In all 10 villages, mattresses were 
reported either not available at all or at best irregularly 
available. In nine of the 10 villages, this applied to 
cooking oil, salt, soap, sugar, batteries and paraffin. Soap 
was named in eight, clothes and radios in seven, and matches 
and insecticides in five. 
The most obvious explanations of these shortages are decline 
in the Tanzanian national economy and its causes, 
international and national; and problems of production and 
supply. But another cause was the prolonged hostility of 
party and bureaucracy to private rural trade, at first 
directed against Asian traders, and later with Operation 
Maduka in 1976 against all traders. Operation Maduka required 
the closing down of all private retail outlets in the rural 
areas and the creation of communal shops in their place. The 
immediate result was acute shortages of basic goods such as 
sugar, salt, paraffin, soap and matchboxes (Hyden 1980:132). 
It is perhaps no coincidence that the village (No. 5 in Table 
4) in the survey with fewest shortages was the only one 
reported as having a private as well as a village (communal) 
shop. 
Basic goods are fundamental for other basic needs: 
agricultural tools and artisans' equipment and supplies for 
productive work and livelihoods; clothing, salt, soap and 
simple medicines for health; paper, pencils and pens for 
education; bicycle and other vehicle spare parts for 
transport; iron tools for the construction of shelter. 
Medicaments can provide one illustration. Basic medicines and 
remedies can be supplied through the market and its retail 
outlets. In rural areas in many parts of the world, small 
shops stock anti-malarials, aspirins, antiseptics and other 
medicines. The village storekeeper was among those to whom 
David Werner addressed his excellent handbook Where There is 
. No Doctor (1977), recognising the small trader as a person who 
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could give simple medical guidance to customers. But first 
there have to be stores and storekeepers. 
Not surprisingly, both the Zambia and the Tanzania Basic Needs 
Missions recommended measures for the revival of rural trade. 
Table 4: Non-availability of Basic Goods in 10 Tanzanian 
Villages, 1980 
Village 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total Total 'Not 
available 1 
Mattresses X X X X X X X X X X 10 7 
Cooking oil X X X X X X X X X 9 6 
Salt X X X X X X X X X 9 2 
Sugar X X X X X X X X X 9 2 
Batter ies X X X X X X X X X 9 4 
Paraf f in X X X X X X X X X 9 5 
Mabati 1 X X X X X X X X X 9 8 
Soap X X X X X X X X 8 2 
Clothes X X X X X X X 7 1 
Radios X X X X X X X 7 4 
Matches X X X X X 5 0 
Insecticides X X X X X 5 3 
Jembe 2 X X X X 4 3 
Blankets X X X 3 2 
1. Corrugated iron sheets. 
2. Hoes. 
Source: ILO 1982:286-97. 
Note: The items marked were variously recorded as 'not 
available', 'in acute short supply' (village 3), 
'irregular supply', 'available only occasionally', and 
'not regularly available'. 
Village District Reg ion 
1 Mwanyumba Muheza Tanga 
2 Ilolunguru Tabora Tabora 
3 Maha'na Magu Mwanza 
4 Ndoombo Arumeru Arusha 
5 Image T r inga I r inga 
6 Veyuma Dodoma Dodoma 
7 Kitungwa Morogoro Morogoro 
8 Buswahili Musoma Mara 
9 Lipingo Mbinga Ruvuma 
10 Baraki Tar ime Mara 
Not only shrinking economies and supplies, but also Government 
policies of pricing and licensing had squeezed, ruined and 
eliminated innumerable small rural trading enterprises. In 
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consequence, many rural people had been acutely deprived, over 
and above their previous poverty. As Jo.' n Robinson once put 
it, 'The misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing 
compared to the misery of not being exploited at all1 (1962, 
quoted in Streeten 1983: 875). The vast rural majority would 
almost certainly agree, and would prefer exploitation by 
private traders to the effects of harrassment of private 
traders by bureaucracy, party and state. For basic goods are 
basic needs; and they are almost always best supplied through 
private retail trade. 
iii) basic services 
Many services can be considered basic, including the supply of 
agricultural inputs, marketing of agricultural produce, and 
services for health, water supply, education and transport. 
In stagnant or declining economies, as in Zambia and Tanzania, 
these present a common pattern. In earlier periods of 
expansion, capital investment built and extended physical 
facilities such as offices, roads, schools, health centres, 
and water supplies, intensifying their coverage in the rural 
cores, and pushing them further out into the rural 
peripheries. Staff were increased. Recurrent budgets rose. 
When more stringent conditions came (especially after the oil 
price rise in 1973) cuts were made in recurrent budgets. 
These fell least on staff and most on maintenance and repair 
(of roads, vehicles, buildings, water supplies), transport 
(fuel and spares), and supplies (textbooks, teaching 
materials, drugs, paraffin for refrigerators to maintain the 
cold chain for vaccines, and so on). Again and again the 
result was physical facilities with staff in place but without 
adequate means to run them. In Luapula Province in Zambia in 
1981, only six per cent of expenditures under the Lima 
(agricultural) programme were directly related to the action 
end of the programme (production units, vegetable gardens, 
poultry units, fish ponds, and demonstration plots) (Kalumba 
1982:36-7). The Zambia Mission found many similar cases (ILO 
1982b Vol. 2:91-114). Especially but not only in the 
peripheral areas, the quality and reliability of services was 
hit, the morale of staff damaged, and the confidence of the 
public undermined. 
To distant officials in the IMF in Washington, or in offices 
in Lusaka, Dodoma or other capitals, the effects of recurrent 
budget cuts on the poorer are unseen. But one illustration 
from the Zambia Basic Needs Report (ILO 1982b:75) can make the 
point: 
'A woman who lives 15 km from the nearest health centre 
has a sick child. The difficulties of travel are such 
that her decision whether to take the child to the health 
centre is in the balance. If she hears that the centre is 
short of drugs, and occasionally out of them altogether, 
she may not risk a fruitless journey. The child may then 
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suffer avoidably, or die. If, on the other hand, she 
knows that the health centre is always adequately stocked, 
and all comers are in consequence treated, she may decide 
to go. The child may then suffer less, and live. It is 
innumerable, individual, unseen ways like this that the 
benefits of adequate recurrent allocations reach the 
poorer, weaker and more remote people. Those who make the 
allocations can never know the wide ramifications of their 
decisions: but imagination can suggest the costs and 
benefits of those decisions to those who are unseen.1 
(italics in original) 
As emphasised in the Zambia and Tanzania Reports, the 
priorities are (contrary to the biases of project aid) to 
reduce investment and increase recurrent expenditure, thus 
raising capacity utilisation and improving the quality and 
reliability of services, whether they are schools, health 
centres, water supplies, roads, or agricultural programmes. 
Some judicious changes, for example buying 131 bicycles for 
the cost of one Landrover (ILO 1982b:75), can help. Some 
simplifications, for example in national drug formularies, can 
save money and increase coverage. Beyond this, to make past 
investments and existing recurrent commitments for staff more 
effective, the marginal benefits from additional funds for 
supplies and maintenance will be very high, especially where 
these can be pushed out into the neglected peripheries. 
Action for the Rural Poorer 
Many analysts allow themselves to be misled into supposing 
that direct solutions to obvious problems will make things 
better for everyone, including by implication the rural 
poorer. Overcoming the development crisis of SSA so that 
growth takes the place of decline is one such solution; trying 
to attack population growth with massive family planning 
campaigns is another. But growth does not of itself assure 
that gains will go to the rural poorer - urban dwellers and 
the wealthier rural producers may appropriate them. Nor does 
a smaller family necessarily benefit poor parents for whom 
more children make sense because many children die and they 
need children for support in old age. Growth and population 
control are needed in the wider social interest, but 
particular poor households need benefits which are personal 
and tangible. 
As we have seen, these can be sought through livelihoods which 
give them subsistence and cash and through an effective supply 
of basic goods and services. To enable them to command these, 
many measures can be proposed, and which are best will vary. 
Some of the more widely applicable are the following:12 
A. Livelihoods: subsistence and effective demand 
i. buffers for the poorer. Vulnerability to contingencies, 
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and the need for buffers or reserves to meet them, 
implies programmes to enable more of the poorer 
households to own assets such as goats, sheep, poultry, 
cattle, trees, and savings accounts which can be sold or 
cashed when in need. 
ii. R and D tor the poorer. Most R and D, whether biological 
(agricultural, forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries) or 
mechanical (for tools, transport, processing) takes place 
in resource-rich environments and is suitable only for 
rural people who are resource-rich. Agricultural and 
mechanical R and D in resource-poor conditions and with 
the poorer people as professional colleagues and clients 
can generate technologies which fit the needs and 
resources of the more deprived - micro-farmers with tiny 
plots, women heads of households, farmers in semi-arid 
peripheries, herders of smallstock, and so on. 
iii. micro-capital.. Many poorer households lack critical 
items of micro-capital - animal-drawn implements, basic 
equipment for wells, good agricultural tools, or simple 
machines for processing crops. Tractors are often 
heavily subsidised. The case for subsidising 
micro-capital, on both social and economic grounds, is 
usually much stronger. 
iv. prices and markets. Higher floor prices and better 
marketing for whatever the poorer can produce in surplus 
to sell (cassava, millets, sorghum, fish, charcoal, 
honey) , are two straightforward ways of helping them to 
be less poor in a self-reliant manner. 
B. Supply of basic goods and services 
i. augmenting the supply of basic goods. To reverse the 
shrink back in the supply of basic goods, where it has 
occurred, requires increased supplies (through local 
production with backward linkages where possible, but 
otherwise through imports) and encouraging private rural 
retailing without price restrictions, or with limited 
restrictions which allow realistically for transport 
costs and profit margins. 
ii. Improving basic services. Of many measures, as argued 
above, the most universal are to increase the supplies 
needed to run services effectively and to enhance staff 
mobility. 
In the straitened circumstances in which many governments in 
SSA find themselves, policy and programme decisions are more 
critical for the rural poorer than in the past. Conditions 
also change fast. One problem is how governments can keep in 
touch with the reality. Monitoring particular households and 
other systematic methods of rapid appraisal are one means that 
does not appear to have received adequate trials. Somehow the 
implications of central decisions to the poorer rural people 
have to be brought home to those who make them. When 
conditions are bad, small things mean more. The difference in 
quality of life between having soap and not having it, or 
between having salt and not having it, is not normally 
experienced by most of those whose decisions affect their 
availabiltiy. One of the main lessons of the Basic Needs 
Missions and Reports is the importance of reflection on the 
impact of central decisions and allocations on the rural poor. 
For this, imagination, commitment and courage are required, to 
offset the forces which draw and allocate resources to those 
who need them least, and to ensure that a greater share is 
commanded by those who are poorer, weaker, and more at risk. 
Action by the Rural Poorer 
This paper could end on that pious note. But the sad and 
brutal fact is that elites as a whole rarely care for their 
unseen poorer compatriots unless their plight is forcefully 
brought to their attention, backed by political power. To 
this commonplace of social and political history contemporary 
sub-Saharan Africa is no exception. In Zambia, organised 
interests - the large farmers in the Zambia National Farmers' 
Union and the mineworkers through their union - have been 
powerful and effective pressure groups. In contrast, 
impoverished fisherpeople, women heads of households, charcoal 
burners, growers of sorghum, cassava and beans, and beekeepers 
have been scattered, unorganised, inarticulate, out of sight 
and out of mind. They have needed, but have not had, their 
own organisations to counterbalance urban and elite power and 
to negotiate and secure fair prices and effective services. 
The danger is that with economic stagnation or decline, and 
with rapidly rising populations, poor rural people will be too 
preoccupied with survival and too isolated and politically 
weak to combine and demand a better deal. If international 
and domestic conditions lead to economic growth, and if more 
political leaders, bureaucrats and others of the elites put 
the rural poor first in deed as well as word, then their 
chances will be better. But the best hope for them, with or 
without growth, with or without allies in the elites, would 
seem to lie in organised pressure to secure a bigger and 
fairer share of the cake. For, in the vicissitudes of 
economic growth and decline, unless they can exercise more 
power, they will continue to be the last to gain and the first 
to lose. 
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I am much indebted to those in Zambia who helped and 
contributed to the rural work of the ILO/JASPA Basic 
Needs Mission of 1980, not least colleagues on the 
Mission, especially Janice Jiggins with whom I shared 
responsibility for the rural section, and Hans Singer for 
useful comments on a draft. In writing it, I have also 
drawn on other sources, especially ILO/JASPA (Jobs and 
Skills Programme for Africa) Basic Needs Reports (ILO 
1977, 1979, 1981a, b, c, 1982, and Livingstone 1981). 
The paper was written as a contribution to an ILO/JASPA 
volume The Challenge of Employment in Africa to be 
published by Oxford University Press in 1985. 
Responsibility for errors and opinions is mine alone and 
not that of any organisation or other person. 
For a revealing study of the conditions of spontaneous 
settlement in Kenya, see Mbithi and Barnes 1975. For the 
conditions of 'spontaneous' rural refugee settlement, see 
Chambers 1979. 
The interviews were in Kakamega District in Western 
Kenya, an area of very dense population and numerous 
markets and shops. 
This was equivalent, at the controlled price for salt, to 
one fiftieth of the minimum rural wage and one hundredth 
of the minimum urban wage. 
For a fuller presentation, see Chambers 1983:4-27 and 
104-108. 
Visiting Monze in Zambia in June 1980, I asked whether I 
would find the District Agricultural Officer in his 
office and was told 'You won't find him anywhere else'. 
His vehicle was due for boarding and was virtually 
useless. His petrol allocation was one 44 gallon drum 
for three months, but even this arrived late. He had 
last been out of station two months earlier, in April, to 
a field day and that was through help from another 
department. 
Also in Zambia in June 1980, the vehicle I had been lent 
had difficulty on dusty roads off the tarmac because 
there were no spares available for its defective air 
filter. Thus a foreign exchange crisis, by creating 
shortages of spare parts, accentuated tarmac bias. 
The sources for this paper show that this point about 
out-of-dateness is at least not itself out-of-date. 
It continued: 'It should further imply the satisfaction 
of needs of a more qualitative nature: a healthy, humane 
and satisfying environment, and popular participation in 
the making of decisions that affect the lives and 
livelihood of the people and individual freedoms.' 
10. The perception of deforestation as a problem reflects the 
spatial biases of rural development tourism. Trees are 
most cut for firewood near urban centres and along 
roadsides and are often abundant elsewhere. One 
unfortunate result is the failure to recognise and 
exploit the vast natural renewable energy reserves and 
potentials of the bush of much of Tanzania and Zambia. 
Most transport in the rural peripheries of those 
countries could be powered by the known technologies of 
producer gas from wood (Foley and Barnard 1983) , thus 
saving foreign exchange, generating income round the year 
for wood collectors and sellers, and probably providing 
cheaper transport. The energy required for a vehicle a 
day on a remote road in Zambia could be provided 
indefinitely with natural regeneration by the equivalent 
of a roadside strip only two metres wide. 15 kg. of wood 
are equivalent to about 4 gallons of petrol. (ILO 
1981b:76.) 
11. Whether defined as basic needs or not, poor rural people 
may want protection against ethnic violence, theft, 
vermin, Police, Army, the Party, or bueaucrats; 
recreation; freedom to practice their customs; and many 
other things. 
12. For more details, the reader is referred to the various 
ILO Reports cited. The list here has special reference 
to Zambia, for which see ILO 1982b and also Chambers and 
Singer 1981:41-4. 
13. In the Zambia Report (1981b:82) the exact opposite of 
this point was made in the text through an error in 
typesetting which omitted a whole line. As printed, the 
Report read 'In contrast, The Mineworkers' Union and the 
ZCTU (Zambia Confederation of Trade Unions) speak and 
negotiate for the charcoal-burners, the bee-keepers ..." 
This is precisely not the case. The interests of the 
Mineworkers' Union and of the ZCTU are in low prices for 
rural produce, while those of the fisherpeople, cassava, 
sorghum and bean growers, charcoal-burners and 
bee-keepers are in high prices for rural produce. The 
Report suggested a National Rural Producers' Union to 
represent small-scale rural producers, with sections for 
special interests. This did not feature in the 
recommendations of the 1983 National Seminar held on the 
Report (Ncube, Serpell and Mwali 1983). 
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